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ABSTRACT
The verification and validation of cyber-physical systems is
known to be a difficult problem due to the different model-
ing abstractions used for control components and for soft-
ware components. A recent trend to address this difficulty
is to reduce the need for verification by adopting correct-by-
design methodologies. According to the correct-by-design
paradigm, one seeks to automatically synthesize a controller
that can be refined into code and that enforces temporal
specifications on the cyber-physical system. In this paper we
consider an instance of this problem where the specifications
are given by a fragment of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and
the physical environment is described by a smooth differen-
tial equation. The contribution of this paper is to show that
synthesis for cyber-physical systems is viable by considering
a fragment of LTL that is expressive enough to describe in-
teresting properties but simple enough to avoid Safra’s con-
struction. We report on two examples illustrating a prelim-
inary implementation of these techniques on the tool Pes-
soaLTL.
1. INTRODUCTION
The correct-by-design, or controller synthesis, paradigm of-
fers a compelling alternative to current system design method-
ologies relying on extensive testing and/or verification to
prove correctness. Intuitively, synthesis is the problem of al-
gorithmically constructing an implementation from a given
specification of the desired functionality and performance,
and a partial model of the system. Controller synthesis has
been studied in various forms in different communities, dif-
fering in the form of the model and the specification. For
example, in continuous control theory, the partial model is
the open loop plant
x˙ = f(x, u),
and the controller is a feedback function u = k(x) such that
the controlled system x˙ = f(x, k(x)) satisfies certain sta-
bility and performance criteria. Similarly, in (discrete) re-
active synthesis, the partial implementation is usually an
input-enabled, unconstrained automaton, the specification
is given as a temporal logic formula capturing the good be-
haviors of the system, and the controller is an automaton
ensuring that its product with the partial implementation
only generates good behaviors.
Over the past decades, there has been a convergence of
control-theoretic methods with automata-theoretic ones, in
order to model hybrid or cyber-physical systems in which
discrete components interact with continuous ones. These
systems are often complex yet safety-critical, and thus, the
application of program synthesis techniques —as opposed to
the current practice of design and extensive verification and
validation— is likely to have a large impact. However, there
are some key technical challenges that have to be overcome
in order to apply synthesis to this domain.
First, we have to abstract the underlying continuous state
space into discrete parts so that reactive synthesis techniques
can be applied. Moreover, such abstractions need to be con-
structed in such a way that a controller designed for the
abstraction can be refined to a controller enforcing the spec-
ification on the original continuous model.
Second, the specification language must be expressive enough
to capture many properties of interest in the domain. In the
reactive synthesis world, linear temporal logic (LTL) [19] (or
equivalently, automata over infinite words [29]) is usually
considered as a robust and expressive specification formal-
ism. Synthesis algorithms based on deep automata-theoretic
constructions [5, 23, 18, 20, 21, 12] are well-known for this
formalism. Unfortunately, these algorithms have very high
theoretical and practical complexities. Theoretically, the
problem is complete for 2EXPTIME. Moreover, Safra’s de-
terminization construction [25], a key step in the algorithms,
is extremely difficult to implement, and the best implemen-
tations so far can only handle small automata. This has
limited the possibility of practical synthesis tools.
In this paper, we present PessoaLTL, an automatic syn-
thesis tool for cyber-physical systems. PessoaLTL takes as
input a controlled differential equation modeling the phys-
ical components, a specification consisting of two parts: a
safety part in safe-LTL and an easily determinizable liveness
part, and a parameter ε specifying the desired precision, and
outputs, if possible, a software controller that ensures that
the model together with the controller satisfies the specifica-
tion up to precision ε (in a technical sense). The controller
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is refined to Simulink blocks for closed-loop simulation.
We overcome the two challenges mentioned above in the fol-
lowing way. First, we use recent techniques reported in [22,
33, 17] to compute discrete abstractions of the differential
equation model of the underlying continuous state space.
Second, we use a restricted subset of LTL for our speci-
fication language, chosen to be expressive enough to nat-
urally capture many requirements that frequently arise in
cyber-physical systems design, and yet enabling controller
synthesis without Safra’s construction (or the manipulation
of co-Bu¨chi tree automata [12]).
Our choice of the specification formalism is driven by our
observation that many specifications for controller synthe-
sis problems in embedded systems and robotics essentially
consist of an “involved” safety part (stating that the system
should always remain in“safe”states) and a“simple” liveness
or guarantee part (stating that eventually the system should
reach a special set of states). For example, a typical require-
ment in robotic applications is to reach a goal state while
avoiding obstacles. A typical problem in control is to force
a system to move between different operating points while
staying within a desired operational envelope. This occurs,
e.g., when we press a button in an elevator requesting that
we reach a different floor while maintaining the elevator ve-
locity and acceleration within certain limits for safety as well
as comfort reasons. Accordingly, our specification language
consists of two parts: a safety part in safe LTL, and a guar-
antee part given as an until formula. We use the fact that
automata for safe LTL can be determinized using the usual
subset construction [13], letting us avoid Safra’s construc-
tion in the implementation. Moreover, we can symbolically
compute maximal strategies for the safety part. In a second
step, we can compute the strategy to ensure the guaran-
tee part while ensuring the safety specification. Although
our synthesis algorithms are based on enforcing a safety in-
variant on the product of the system and the automaton
constructed from the safe LTL formula, the use of safe LTL
directly allows us to write specifications more naturally than
if using invariants.
We developed PessoaLTL as an extension of Pessoa1 using
both the abstraction algorithms as well as a solver for safety
games using BDDs provided by Pessoa. We report prelimi-
nary results on the use of PessoaLTL. Drawing inspiration
from robotics, we illustrate by two nontrivial examples how
embedded control software synthesis problems can be au-
tomatically solved. The first example considers the motion
planning problem with obstacles and requires a LTL formula
comprising both safety as well as guarantee properties. In
the second example we consider a more detailed model for
the robot by incorporating information about the protocol
used to mediate between the sensors and the main proces-
sor. Since the main processor mail fail to acquire sensor
measurements, we consider the requirement of reducing the
robot velocity, or even completely stopping the robot, when
not enough measurements are acquired. While in the worst
case, the complexity of the algorithm is still 2EXPTIME
[13], in practice, the subset construction has not been a bot-
tleneck.
1Available from http://www.cyphylab.ee.ucla.edu/pessoa.
Related work We have already mentioned the rich history
of reactive synthesis using automata-theoretic techniques.
Work on the synthesis problem for cyber-physical systems
is quite recent. The use of finite-state abstractions of differ-
ential equations and hybrid systems to solve synthesis prob-
lems has been pursued by several authors [4, 9, 24, 10, 31,
27]. However, no new novel synthesis algorithms, at the
automata level, are proposed in these references.
Most tools for synthesis restrict speicifications to state in-
variants. This is mostly because automata theoretic synthe-
sis algorithms for general LTL properties require a complex
determinization step [25] which is hard to implement effi-
ciently [1, 28].
In [14, 32] controller synthesis enforcing temporal require-
ments on cyber-physical systems is discussed. Although dif-
ferent synthesis algorithms are proposed in these references,
both assume a bounded temporal horizon for the satisfac-
tion of the property. The work [14] uses model checking
algorithms to find the feasible set of inputs. These inputs
are bounded, since it is based on bounded temporal horizon
assumptions. The liveness properties with bounded hori-
zon are examples of bounded-safe properties. The fragment
of LTL handled by PessoaLTL includes all bounded-safe
properties. Furthermore, PessoaLTL also supports guar-
antee properties that require no restrictions on the time it
takes for satisfaction.
In [7, 8], the authors have also restricted attention to spec-
ification formalisms which have efficient game solving algo-
rithms, and used such algorithms to synthesize hardware
components. Our focus here is embedded and robotics ap-
plications, for which our restricted specification language is
a good fit. The abstraction of differential equation mod-
els for the physical components is an added dimension of
complexity in our case.
The synthesis of switching policies for cyber-physical sys-
tems is discussed in [6]. Although, the resulting switching
policies enforce the desired specifications, the work in [6] as-
sumes that the continuous dynamics in each mode is fixed.
In contrast, our algorithms do not assume the a priory ex-
istence of different modes with different dynamics.
While our constructions do not introduce any new deep in-
sight into the nature of synthesis, we believe our specification
formalism and implemented algorithms represent a practi-
cal sweet spot in controller synthesis for cyber-physical sys-
tems.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Systems
We consider the following notion of system that will be used
to model software components as well as the abstraction of
physical components.
Definition 1. A system
S = (X,X0, U,→, Y,H)
consists of: a set of states X; a set of initial states X0 ⊆ X;
a set of inputs U ; a transition relation →⊆ X × U × X; a
set of outputs Y ; and an output map H : X → Y .
A system is said to be finite when the set of states X is finite.
When the set of outputs Y of a system S is equipped with
a metric d : Y ×Y → R+0 , we say that S is a metric system.
Metric systems will be used to formalize finite abstractions
of differential equations in Section 2.3.
We write x→u x′ when (x, u, x′) ∈→. For such a transition,
state x′ is called a u-successor, or simply successor, of state
x. Similarly, x is called a u-predecessor, or predecessor, of
state x′. For technical reasons, we assume that for every x
and u, there is some x′ such that x →u x′. We denote the
set of u-successors of a state x by Postu(x). A system is
said to be deterministic if (x, u, x′) ∈→ and (x, u, x′′) ∈→
implies x′ = x′′, or equivalently, if Postu(x) is a singleton
for each x ∈ X and i ∈ U .
A run of a system S is an infinite sequence
x0 →u0 x1 →u1 . . . (1)
where x0 ∈ X0, and for each i ≥ 0, we have xi →ui xi+1.
The outputs associated with the run (1) is the trace
H(x0)H(x1) . . . ∈ Y ω.
Given an infinite string z ∈ Zω, we will use the notation z(i)
to denote the ith element in the string z and the notation
z[k] to denote the infinite string obtained from z by removing
its first k elements, i.e., z[k](i) = z(i+ k).
The notion of system in Definition 1 allows for nondeter-
minism in the sense that for a given state x ∈ X and input
u ∈ U , there may be more than one u-successor of x. We as-
sume that once the input u is chosen at the state x, the exact
u-successor of x is selected from Postu(x) by the environ-
ment. We regard this nondeterminism as the adversarial in-
fluence of the environment, and consider a two-person game
between the controller (player 0) and the non-determinism
(player 1).
2.2 Controllers
A strategy for the controller (player 0) in a system S =
(X,X0, U,→, Y,H) is a mapping pi0 : (X×U)∗×X 7→ U that
associates with every non-empty finite sequence of states
and inputs ending in X, representing the past history of the
game, an action. A strategy for player 1 is a mapping pi1 :
(X×U)∗×X×U 7→ X that associates with every non-empty
finite sequence of states and inputs ending in x ∈ X and after
action u ∈ U has been taken, representing the past history
of the game, a successor state x′ ∈ Postu(x). A controller
strategy pi0 is memoryless if the strategy depends on the
current state only i.e., ∀x ∈ X, ∀z,w ∈ (X×U)∗, pi0(z ·x) =
pi0(w · x).
An initial state x0 ∈ X0, strategy pi0 for player 0, and pi1 for
player 1 uniquely determine a run:
Outcome(x0, pi0, pi1) = x0 →u0 x1 . . . ∈ (X × U)ω (2)
where for k ≥ 0, we have uk = pi0(x0, . . . , xk), and xk+1 =
pi1(x0, . . . , xk, uk). Based on (2) we define the infinite state
behavior:
states(x0, pi0, pi1) = x0x1x2 . . . ∈ Xω
and the corresponding outputs as:
outputs(x0, pi0, pi1) = H(x0)H(x1)H(x2) . . . ∈ Y ω.
For i ∈ {0, 1}, given an initial state x and a winning objec-
tive Φ ⊆ Y ω, we say the state x ∈ X is winning for player-i
if there is a player i strategy pii, such that, for all player-
(1− i) strategies pi1−i, we have outputs(x, pi0, pi1) ∈ Φ. The
controller synthesis problem asks, given a system S and an
objective Φ ⊆ Y ω, to construct a strategy pi for player 0
such that every initial state x0 is winning for Φ, that is,
outputs(x0, pi, pi1) ∈ Φ for every x0 ∈ X0 and every player 1
strategy pi1. In that case, pi is called a controller for Φ, and
player 0 is said to enforce Φ.
A strategy-set (for player 0) is a function pˆi0 : (X × U)∗ ×
X → 2U . A strategy pi0 for player 0 is compatible with a
strategy-set pˆi0 if for each z ∈ (X ×U)∗ and x ∈ X, we have
pi0(z ·x) ∈ pˆi0(z ·x). A strategy-set pˆi0 for player 0 is winning
for a winning objective Φ if every strategy compatible with
pˆi0 is winning for player 0. A strategy-set pˆi0 is maximal
for Φ if it is winning for Φ and every winning strategy of
player 0 for Φ is compatible with pˆi. A strategy-set pˆi0 is
memoryless if it only depends on the final state and not
the history of the play. As with strategies, we represent a
memoryless strategy-set as a function pˆi0 : X → 2U .
As an example, let Z ⊆ Y and consider the property Φ to
be the set of traces Zω. This is called a safety game, and
player 0 wins this game from x if she has a strategy pi0 such
that for every strategy pi1 of player 1, outputs(x, pi0, pi1) is
a trace consisting only of outputs in Z (the game always
remains in Z). It is known that player 0 has a memoryless
maximal strategy in a safety game [34].
For a set X ′ ⊆ X, define CPre(X ′) = {x ∈ X | ∃u ∈
U.Postu(x) ⊆ X ′}. The set CPre(X ′) consists of all states
from which player 0 can force a visit to X ′ in one step, no
matter how player 1 resolves the nondeterminism. One can
solve a safety game by iterating CPre, starting from the set
H−1(Z), until a fixpoint is reached [16, 34]:
νx.H−1(Z) ∩ CPre(x)
Indeed, this algorithm for solving safety games has been
implemented in several tools, including Pessoa.
2.3 Approximate Alternating Simulation
In order to capture the adversarial intent of the environment,
the notion of equivalence and pre-order used in this paper is
that of alternating simulation. Moreover, since the results
in [22, 33] are used to relate differential equation models of
physical systems to finite abstractions, we consider approx-
imate alternating simulation relations.
Definition 2. Let Sa and Sb be metric systems with Ya =
Yb and let ε ∈ R+0 . A relationR ⊆ Xa ×Xb is an ε-approximate
alternating simulation relation from Sa to Sb if the following
three conditions are satisfied:
1. for every xa0 ∈ Xa0 there exists xb0 ∈ Xb0 with (xa0, xb0) ∈
R;
2. for every (xa, xb) ∈ R we have d(Ha(xa), Hb(xb)) ≤ ε;
3. for every (xa, xb) ∈ R and for every ua ∈ Ua(xa) there
exists ub ∈ Ub(xb) such that for every x′b ∈ Postub(xb)
there exists x′a ∈ Postua(xa) satisfying (x′a, x′b) ∈ R.
We say that Sa is ε-approximately alternatingly simulated
by Sb or that Sb ε-approximately alternatingly simulates
Sa, denoted by Sa εAS Sb, if there exists an ε-approximate
alternating simulation relation from Sa to Sb.
The results in [22, 33] show that for any differential equation
model of the physical world, it is possible to construct a fi-
nite system S that is ε-approximate alternatingly simulated
by the differential equation. Hence, once we synthesize a
controller for the finite abstraction, such controller can be
refined to a controller enforcing the same specification on
the differential equation up to an error of ε. Note that ε is
a design parameter that can be made as small as desired, at
the expense of a larger finite abstraction. In the remainder
of the paper we will assume that we have already abstracted
the differential equation into a finite system. The construc-
tions of such abstractions has been implemented in the freely
available tool Pessoa [17].
3. SPECIFICATIONS
3.1 Linear Temporal Logic
We now review the syntax and semantics of linear-temporal
logic (LTL) [19].
Definition 3. The set of LTL formulae is generated by the
following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | © ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕW ϕ
where p is chosen from a set P of atomic propositions.
We define shorthands true and false as shorthand for p∨¬p
and p ∧ ¬p respectively. We use 3ϕ and 2ϕ as shorthands
of (true U ϕ) and (ϕ W false) respectively.
An LTL formula is in negation normal form (NNF) if nega-
tion occurs only before the atomic propositions. It is known
that any formula can be put in NNF by applying de Mor-
gan’s laws (for Boolean operations), and the identities ¬¬ϕ ≡
ϕ, ¬© ϕ ≡ ©¬ϕ, and ¬(ϕ1Wϕ2) ≡ ¬ϕ2U¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ1. The
length |ϕ| of a formula ϕ is the number of symbols in ϕ and
defined by induction on the structure of ϕ in a standard way.
The semantics of LTL formulae is defined over infinite se-
quences z ∈ (2P)ω:
• z |= p iff p ∈ z(0));
• z |= ¬ϕ iff z 6|= ϕ;
• z |= ϕ∧ψ iff z |= ϕ and z |= ψ;
• z |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff z |= ϕ or z |= ψ;
• z |=©ϕ iff z[1] |= ϕ;
• z |= ϕUψ iff ∃k ≥ 0 s.t. z[k] |= ψ and z[j] |= ϕ for all
0 ≤ j < k.
• z |= ϕWψ iff z[i] |= ϕ for all i ∈ N0 or ∃k ≥ 0 z[k] |= ψ
and z[j] |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < k.
If z |= ϕ, we say z satisfies ϕ. For an LTL formula ϕ, the
language L(ϕ) of all strings satisfying ϕ is defined by:
L(ϕ) = {z ∈ (2P)ω | z |= ϕ}.
Let S be a system where Y = 2P and thusH maps each state
x ∈ X to the set of atomic propositions that are true at x.
We say player 0 enforces the LTL formula ϕ if there exists a
player 0 strategy pi0 such that for each player 1 strategy pi1
and each x0 ∈ X0 we have that outputs(x0, pi0, pi1) satisfies
ϕ.
3.2 Safe-LTL
We now define a subset of LTL formulas that capture all
safety properties.
Definition 4. The set of safe-LTL formulae is generated
by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | © ϕ | ϕW ϕ
where p ranges over a set P of atomic propositions.
A safe-LTL formula always defines a safety property. Intu-
itively, a formula ϕ defines a safety property if z 6|= ϕ can be
checked by looking at a finite prefix of z.
Thus, reasoning about safety properties on infinite behav-
iors can be reduced to reasoning about their finite prefixes.
First, we recall nondeterministic finite automata as accep-
tors of languages over finite words. A nondeterministic finite
automaton (NFA) is a 5-tuple A = (Q, Q0, Σ, δ, F ), where Q
is a finite set of states, Q0 ⊆ Q is a set of initial states, F ⊆ Q
is a set of final states, Σ is an alphabet, and δ ⊆ Q×Σ×Q is
a set of transitions. An NFA is deterministic, written DFA,
if |Q0| = 1 and δ defines a total function from Q× Σ into
Q. The unique successor of a state q ∈ Q under the letter
σ ∈ Σ in a deterministic automaton is denoted by δ(q, σ). A
run of an NFA on a word σ ≡ σ0 . . . σn−1 ∈ Σ∗ is a sequence
q0
σ0−→ q1 . . . qn−1 σn−1−−−→ qn such that q0 ∈ Q0 and for each
0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 we have (qi, σi, qi+1) ∈ δ. A run is accepting
if moreover qn ∈ F , and we say the NFA accepts σ. The
language of an NFA is the set of all words σ ∈ Σ∗ such that
the NFA has an accepting run on σ.
The set of bad prefixes for a safety formula ϕ is defined by:
Bad(ϕ) = {z ∈ (2P)∗ | ∀w ∈ (2P)ω z.w 6|= ϕ}.
That is, a (finite) prefix z is bad if none of its infinite exten-
sions z · w satisfies the formula ϕ. The set of fine prefixes is
the set of finite prefixes that are sufficient to prove that the
computation is unsafe. We say that a set Z ⊆ Bad(ϕ) is a
trap for the safety language L(ϕ) iff every word w /∈ L(ϕ)
(a) Fine Automaton for p W q. (b) Determinized Version
Figure 1: p W q
has at least one prefix z ∈ Z. We denote all the traps for
L(ϕ) by trap(L(ϕ)).
We say that a nondeterministic automaton Nψ is fine for ψ
iff there exists Z ∈ trap(L(ψ)) such that L(Nψ) = Z. Thus,
a fine automaton Nψ may not accept all the bad prefixes,
however it should accept at least one bad prefix of every
computation that does not satisfy ψ.
Kupferman and Vardi [13, 11] show that an automaton fine
for ϕ can be constructed from ϕ. The translation is based
on the reverse deterministic automaton defined in [30]. In
PessoaLTL we implemented the version of Kupferman and
Vardi’s algorithm reported in [15] and presented here as Al-
gorithm 1. This algorithm computes Nϕ from a safe-LTL
formula ϕ. It first computes the set of subformulas cl of ¬ϕ
by the procedure computeClosure. Since each state of the
automaton represent whether each of the subformulas is ei-
ther true or false in that state, the fine automaton can have
at most 2|cl| states.
Proposition 1. For every safe-LTL formula ϕ, Algorithm 1
constructs a nondeterministic fine automaton for ϕ with at
most 2|ϕ| states.
4. CONTROLLER SYNTHESIS
In this section, we assume that we have already computed
a finite abstraction, in the form of a system S, of the physi-
cal components. PessoaLTL accepts a pair of specifications
(ϕS , ϕL): the first, ϕS , is a safe-LTL formula that specifies
the safety requirements of the system, and the second, ϕL,
is a guarantee formula of the form 3p that specifies that the
goal p is eventually reached. We perform controller synthesis
in two steps. First, we compute the maximal winning strat-
egy for player 0 for the safe-LTL part of the specification.
Second, we compute a controller that ensures the guaran-
tee property using a strategy compatible with the maximal
strategy.
4.1 Controller Synthesis for Safe-LTL
For synthesizing a controller for a safe-LTL formula ϕ, we
construct a deterministic automaton on finite words that is
fine for ϕ. Note that Algorithm 1 may produce an NFA.
However, determinization for NFAs over finite words uses
the (easier to implement) subset construction.
Theoretically, the determinization step adds one more expo-
nential, making the complexity of the construction doubly
exponential in the size of ϕ. In our practical examples, this
double exponential behavior has not shown up. For example,
given the fine automaton for pW q, the subset construction
creates the deterministic automaton Figure 1(b).
Given a system S = (X,X0, U,→, Y,H) and a DFA Dϕ =
(Q, q0, Y, δ, F ) fine for ϕ, we define the synchronous product
S ×Dϕ = (X ′, X ′0, U ′,→′, Y ′, H ′) where
• X ′ = X ×Q;
• X ′0 = {(x, q) | x ∈ X0, q = δ(q0, H(x))};
• U ′ = U ;
• (x, q)→′u (x′, q′) if x→u x′ and δ(q,H(x′)) = q′;
• Y ′ = Y ;
• H ′((x, q)) = H(x) for each (x, q) ∈ X ′.
A controller enforcing ϕ on S can be constructed by syn-
thesizing a controller on the synchronus product S × Dϕ
enforcing the specification that the system always remains
Algorithm 1 ConstructFineAutomaton(ψ)
ψ′ := NNF (¬ψ); cl := computeClosure(ψ′)
F := {∅}, Q := {∅}; X := {∅}, Q0 := {}, δ = {}
while X 6= ∅ do
s := Dequeue(X)
foreach σ ∈ Σ
s′ = {}
foreach φ ∈ cl do
switch φ begin
case p = q or p = ¬q for q ∈ Y :
if p is satisfied by σ, then s′ := s′ ∪ {p}
case φ = φ1 ∨ φ2 :
if φ1 ∈ s′ or φ2 ∈ s′ then s′ := s′ ∪ {φ}
case φ = φ1 ∧ φ2 :
if φ1 ∈ s′ and φ2 ∈ s′ then s′ := s′ ∪ {φ}
case φ =©φ1 :
if φ1 ∈ s then s′ := s′ ∪ {φ}
case φ = φ1Uφ2 :
if φ2 ∈ s′ or (φ1 ∈ s′ and φ ∈ s)
then s′ := s′ ∪ {φ}
end switch
end for
if ¬ϕ ∈ s′ then Q0 := Q0 ∪ {s′}
δ := δ ∪ {(s′, σ, s)}
X := X ∪ {s′}, Q := Q ∪ {s′}
end for
end while
return AFine¬ϕ = (Q,Q0, 2
P , δ, F )
in the states X × (Q \ F ), i.e., that player 0 ensures that
no word in the language of Dϕ is seen. This is a safety
game where player 0 keeps the states into an invariant set
(X × (Q \F )), and can be solved using existing methods by
iterating a symbolic controllable-predecessor operator [34,
17]. Moreover, it is well-known that player 0 has memory-
less maximal winning strategies in this game.
Theorem 1. Let S = (X,X0, U,→, Y, H) be system and
let Dϕ = (Q,Q0, Y, δ, F ) be a deterministic finite automaton
fine for the safe-LTL formula ϕ. For any initial state x ∈
X0, player 0 has a winning strategy for the safe-LTL formula
ϕ, if player 0 has a memoryless winning strategy from the
unique x0 ∈ X ′0 to stay in X × (Q \ F ) states in system
S×Dϕ. Moreover, player 0 has a maximal winning strategy
in S ×Dϕ.
Thus, the algorithm to construct a maximal memoryless con-
troller for a system S and a safe-LTL property ϕ proceeds
as follows. First, we construct an NFA Nϕ fine for ϕ. Sec-
ond, we use the subset construction to determinize Nϕ into
a DFA Dϕ. Third, we construct the synchronous product
of S with Dϕ. Finally, we solve the safety game on S ×Dϕ
for the winning set X × (Q \ F ) and construct a maximal
memoryless winning strategy.
4.2 Controller Synthesis for the Guarantee Part
Let S×Dϕ = (X,X0, U,→, Y,H) be the synchronous prod-
uct of a system and a DFA fine for the safe-LTL ϕ, and let
pi be a maximal memoryless winning strategy for player 0
which ensures that all runs of the system stay in the states
X × (Q \ F ).
We define the restriction of S × Dϕ modulo pi to be the
system (X,X0, U,→′, Y,H) where x →′u x′ if x →u x′ and
u ∈ pi(x). That is, we restrict the actions available at a state
to only those allowed by the maximal strategy pi.
We now consider constructing a controller for the guarantee
part 3p. We solve this by constructing a winning strategy in
the reachability game on the product S×Dϕ modulo pi, the
maximal memoryless winning strategy for the safety game.
Again, the solution to the reachability game is constructed
by iterating a symbolic controllable predecessor operator [34,
17].
The resulting strategy ensures that the guarantee part 3p
is enforced by player 0 (by construction in the reachability
game), while always maintaining the safety part (by ensur-
ing that the strategy is compatible with pi). Together, the
controller enforces the specification ϕS ∧ ϕL.
While the current implementation of PessoaLTL only han-
dles guarantee properties of the form 3p (or some syntactic
sugar, e.g., properties of the form p1Up2 using the identity
p1Up2 ≡ p1Wp2 ∧ 3p2), notice that all we need is that a
deterministic generator for the liveness part of the specifi-
cation is efficiently computable. For example, it is easy to
extend the algorithm when the liveness part of the specifi-
cation is a Bu¨chi requirements 23p, or more generally, from
the fragments described in [2].
5. CONTROLLER REFINEMENT
The discussion so far has focused on the synthesis of strate-
gies enforcing LTL formulas over the finite abstraction S of
a physical system. The natural next step is to refine the con-
troller synthesized for S to a controller enforcing the spec-
ification on the differential equation model of the physical
system. Typical controller implementations are done on dig-
ital platforms, hence it is convenient to assume a periodic2
execution of the controller implementation with period τ .
Moreover, a time discretized version of the differential equa-
tion:
x˙ = f(x, u), x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm (3)
modeling the physical system being controlled can be de-
scribed by the system Sτ = (Xτ , Xτ0, Uτ ,→τ , Yτ , Hτ ) con-
sisting of:
• Xτ = Rn;
• Xτ0 = X;
• Uτ = Rm;
• x →uτ x′ if there exists a solution ξ of (3) for the con-
stant input u satisfying ξ(0) = x and ξ(τ) = x′.
• Yτ = Xτ ;
• Hτ (x) = x for any x ∈ Xτ .
2There are also considerable advantages to consider non-
periodic implementations as in [3], however such approaches
are outside the scope of this paper.
The results in [22, 33] guarantee the existence of a finite
system S and of an ε-approximate alternating simulation
relation R from S to Sτ . Note that while Sτ is determin-
istic, the abstraction process introduces nondeterminism in
S. Nevertheless, the existence of the relation R guarantees
that any controller synthesized for S can be refined to a con-
troller for Sτ . A formal description of the refined controller
can be found in [26]. Here, we provide an informal descrip-
tion which we believe to be more informative. Any state
xτ ∈ Xτ of the system Sτ is related by R to a state x ∈ X
in the finite abstraction S. If the strategy pi0 dictates that
the input u ∈ U should be used at the state x, then by using
a constant input curve of duration τ and value u in Sτ , we
are guaranteed to reach a state x′τ ∈ Xτ that is R related to
a state x′ ∈ Postu(x). Hence, the refined controller consists
in a loop performing the following steps:
1. Acquire the current state from sensors/estimators;
2. Identify the state in S that is related by R to the cur-
rent state;
3. Compute the input u given by the strategy pi0;
4. Send the value u to the actuators and keep it constant
for τ units of time;
5. Loop to step 1.
This refined controller enforces the specification on Sτ up to
an error ε as stated in the next result.
Proposition 2. Let Sτ be the time discretization of a
differential equation governing the physical system to be con-
trolled and let ϕ be a LTL formula whose predicates corre-
spond to subsets of Yτ . Consider the finite abstraction S of
Sτ and let R be the ε-approximate alternating simulation re-
lation from S to Sτ . For any strategy pi0 enforcing ϕ on S,
the strategy piτ0 obtained by refining pi0, enforces ϕ on Sτ up
to an error of ε, that is, for any environment strategy pi1 for
S we have d(y(i), yτ (i)) ≤ ε for every i ∈ N, for the unique
y ∈ outputs(x, pi0, pi1), the unique yτ ∈ outputs(xτ , piτ0),
and for any (x, xτ ) ∈ R.
6. CASE STUDY : ROBOT CONTROLLER
We consider a nonholonomic robot described by the follow-
ing differential equations:
x˙ = v cos θ, y˙ = v sin θ, θ˙ = ω
where (x, y) denotes the robot position and θ its orientation.
The inputs are v and ω and correspond to the linear and an-
gular velocity of the robot, respectively. Using pessoa we
compute a finite abstraction S of the differential equation
model of the robot. This abstraction is approximately alter-
natingly simulated by the differential equation model with
a precision of ε = 0.1. In this abstraction the input v is re-
stricted to take values in the set {0, 0.2, 0.4} while the input
ω is restricted to take values in the set {−0.2, 0, 0.2}.
Figure 2: Closed-loop diagram in Simulink showing
the automatically synthesized controller.
6.1 Reachability with Obstacle Avoidance
For every obstacle (see the blue sets in Figure 3) we con-
struct a predicate obstaclei, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, that is true when-
ever the robot is inside the set defined by the obstacle. Sim-
ilarly, we defined the predicate target describing the target
set represented by the red set in Figure 3. The objective
of reaching the target set, if possible, while avoiding the
obstacles is naturally expressed by the safe-LTL formula:
ψ = (¬(obstacle1 ∨ obstacle2 ∨ obstacle3))W target.
Note that ϕ does not require the target set to be reached.
Such requirement can be prescribed by using instead the
LTL formula:
ϕ = (¬(obstacle1 ∨ obstacle2 ∨ obstacle3))U target.
Since ϕ can be decomposed as:
ϕ = ψ ∧ 3 target
we first solve the safety problem specified by ψ and then we
solve the reachability problem specified by 3 target. The
synthesized controller is automatically refined to a Simulink
block in pessoa, see Figure 2, in order to simulate the closed-
loop behavior. In Figure 3 we show the trajectory followed
by the robot, and in Figure 4 we show the inputs used to
steer the robot. The yellow line represents the translational
velocity input while the magenta line represents the angular
velocity input.
Figure 3: Trajectory followed by the robot.
Figure 4: Input signal generated by the controller.
6.2 Fault tolerance
We consider the same robot as in the previous case study.
We assume that the communication between the several sen-
sor onboard of the robot with the microprocessor running
the control code is governed by a protocol that reports if
communication is successful or not. There are several rea-
sons for unsuccessful communication such as the fact that
the communication medium is shared among several sub-
systems and sensor failures. We now consider a specifica-
tion detailing how the robot should operate in case of sensor
failures.
Figure 5: Fine-automaton for the LTL formula (4)
The main microprocessor may fail to receive sensor measure-
ments more than once. In such case the controller should
have a strategy to protect the robot from either leaving the
desired working area or hitting the obstacles. One possi-
ble way of encoding this objective as a safety property is
to require that if sensor measurements are not received two
or more times during three consecutive control cycles, the
robot should stop and remain at its current location. In or-
der to formalize this property we extend the model of the
robot so as to incorporate the previously used input as part
of the state. Consider now the predicate stop, which is true
(resp. false) when the input v is equal to (resp. different
from) zero, and the predicate fail3,2, which is true when
2 or more sensor measurements were not received during 3
consecutive control cycles. Since in LTL we cannot refer to
the past, we encode fail3,2 by making reference to the future
as follows:
fail3,2 = (f ∧©f) ∨ (©f ∧©© f) ∨ (f ∧©© f).
In the preceding formula f is the predicate that becomes true
every time that the microprocessor fails to receive sensor
measurements. The final formula can then be obtained as:
2(fail3,2 →©©© stop). (4)
Figure 5 shows the fine-automaton with respect to the pre-
vious property. In Figure 6 we show the inputs generated
by the controller when the predicate f evolves according to:
f f f ¬ f ¬f f f ¬f ¬f f ¬f f f f.
The yellow line represents the translational velocity input
(v) while the magenta line represents the angular velocity
input (ω). Note that whenever the protocol returns two
consecutive failures (f is true twice), the input v generated
by the controller at the next control cycle is zero. Figure 7
shows the closed-loop evolution of θ, x, y, u and v for the
given fault-sequence. The colors of these state variables are
cyan, yellow, magenta, red and green respectively. We
Figure 6: Inputs Generated by Controller
can easily develop more sophisticated fault tolerance require-
ments. Let slow denote the predicate that holds true when
v = 0.2, corresponding to half of the maximum velocity. We
could, e.g., require that when the sensor measurements are
not received one in three control cycles, the robot show re-
duce its translational speed to v = 0.2. Such specification
can be written as:
2(fail3,1 →©©© slow) (5)
where fail3,1 captures one sensor failure in three control
cycles:
(f∧©f∧©©¬f)∨(¬f∧©f∧©©f)∨(f∧©¬f∧©©f).
By conjoining (4) with (5) we would obtain a more detailed
requirement asking for the robot to slow down when one
Figure 7: States
measurement fails in the three consecutive control cycles,
and to stop when two measurements fail.
Table 8 show the time and space complexity of fine automata
for formula ϕ = 2(failn,k →©nstop) where, k is the num-
ber of faults in n consecutive readings. The length column
denotes the length of nnf(¬ϕ). ©nφ is a shorthand of n-
consecutive © applied to φ.
Parameters length Time(s) |NFA| |DFA|
n =3, k=2 10 0.714 245 10
n=3, k=1 10 1.096 253 10
n=4, k=1 13 12.690 1045 15
n=5, k=1 16 110.026 2717 21
n=6, k=1 19 1957.450 7933 28
Figure 8: Fine Automata Size and Time to build
6.3 Mode-switching
In this section we consider an instantiation of the mode-
switching problem that frequently occurs in the autonomous
vehicles. This problem consists in defining different scenar-
ios and specifying the desired behavior for each of those
scenarios. In a cruise control system, for example, the nom-
inal scenario would require maintaining a desired velocity.
However, in the presence of rain or ice, the velocity may
need to be reduced. Similarly, if the vehicle in front re-
duces its speed, an automatic cruise control system would
immediately reduce the velocity to avoid a collision. Similar
examples of scenarios and corresponding goals can be found
in many different application domains. To model the mode
switching problem in LTL we consider first the template for-
mula ϕi defined as:
sceni =⇒ (sceni ∧ ¬goali)W((sceni ∧ goali)W¬sceni).
This formula is satisfied when if the scenario i happens, then
the system should stay in scenario i state until another sce-
nario happens. Moreover, when the syatem stays in the
scenario i, it shoud try to reach goali states. If we have
n pairs of scenarios and goals, we can construct a formula
ϕi and the final requirement is captured by requiring the
conjunction of these formulas to hold for all time:
2(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn).
To illustrate the mode switching problem in the context of
the mobile robot example, we consider the scenario to be
specified by a remote operator that instructs the robot to
move to one of two locations described by the predicates:
goal1 = {(x, y, θ) ∈ R3 | 4.4 ≤ x ≤ 4.6 ∧ 1 ≤ y ≤ 1.6}
goal2 = {(x, y, θ) ∈ R3 | 4.6 ≤ x ≤ 5.0 ∧ 1 ≤ y ≤ 1.6}
The formulas defining the scenarios are the predicates scen1
and scen2 = ¬scen1 whose truth value can be dynamically
changed by the robot operator according to the location
where he wants the robot to go. The fine automaton for
the resulting specification (Figure 9) was constructed in <1
seconds and has 4 dfa states.
Figure 9: Fine Automaton For Switching Property
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